Abstract. The purpose of an open primary is to incorporate more moderate votes into the primary elections. This intention may backfire when nonparty members strategically participate in the primary, and the result of an open primary might become even more extreme than when nonparty members are not allowed to participate. Realizing this, the party members might also vote strategically to counter-react. If this occurs, then it might actually coordinate the votes of the party's supporters. The effect of strategic voting behavior on the result of a primary depends on the size of the party, turnout rate of nonparty members, the positions of the candidates and the proportion of voters who vote strategically. Strategic voting behavior can sometimes improve social welfare.
Introduction
Strategic voting in presidential nomination campaigns is a behavior which substantially influences the final outcome of the election. For example, winning the early primaries to build up the "momentum," which in turn coordinates the voters' strategic voting behavior, is considered to he of extreme importance for candidates seeking nomination in the U.S. presidential election. In an authoritative study of the importance of momentum in the presidential primaries, Bartels (1988) identifies two types of strategic voting behavior which could play a role in primary campaigns. First, since the primary is only the first stage in a long electoral process, a prospective voter would vote for the one not only she likes, but who also has a chance to win the seat. Second, a voter will not "waste" vote on a candidate who has little chance to win, even if the candidate is her favorite. The result of the influence of these two factors is that those candidates who win in the early primaries and build up momentum have much greater chance of being nominated.
1
While the study of momentum greatly improves our understanding of presidential campaigns, in this paper we identify another type of strategic voting behavior that occurs in open primaries. In an open primary, not only * We thank Gary Cox and a referee for useful comments. party members but also independents and supporters of the other parties can vote to select the nominee. For example, in the first-ever presidential election in Taiwan in 1996, the nominee for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the second largest party in Taiwan, was determined by 50 primaries held in various districts in Taiwan. In every primary, not only DDP members, but also any citizen can register on site and vote.
2 In the U.S., nine states are open primary states and 38 closed.
3 However, in a closed primary, voters only have to register as party supporters for a number of days (ranging from nine to eighty days) in order to vote in the primary (see Eldersveld, 1982 When a primary is open to all voters, the occurrence of crossover voting and "raiding" are inevitable. For example, a nonparty member might deliberately vote for the more extreme candidate whom he likes less, and has less chance to win in the final election, in order to increase the winning chance of the nominee who belongs to the party he supports. As a result, not only the purpose of incorporating moderate view in the open primary is not fulfilled; what's more, the winning chance of the party decreases. This theoretical possibility is also supported by evidence. Hedlund (1977-8) studied the 1976 Wisconsin primaries and found that 58(46)% of the voters in Republican (Democratic) primary were either independents or supporters of the opposition party. Moreover, 48% of the Democratic identifiers voted for Reagan (instead of Ford, who should be more easily identified by the Democrat) in the Republican primary and 41% of the Republican identifiers voted for Wallace (who receives only 7% of the votes from Democratic identifiers) in the Democratic primary. Similar behavior occurred in Taiwan. In the DPP primaries, a prominent member of the New Party (which is at the far opposite to DPP on the ideological spectrum) openly urged the party members to participate and vote for the candidate who is closer to New Party's position. 5 No matter whom the nonparty members vote for in the primary, that they have strong incentive to vote strategically in the open primaries is indisputable.
This kind of strategic voting behavior is clearly different from that arising from the momentum consideration. In the latter, voters lean towards the winners of the previous primary. The main concern of the voters is not to waste vote on candidates who have less chance to win and to vote for one of the winners whom they like more. Moreover, the phenomenon of momentum exists only when there are a sequence of primaries. In our model, in contrast to the momentum literature, the voters might actually vote for the candidate they like least deliberately, hoping this candidate to be nominated and loses in the final election. This can occur even for elections in which there is only one single primary. On the other hand, it occurs only when the primaries
